. Introduction
While taste is often modeled as a stable trait of the individual decision maker, tastes do change over time in many instances. For example, risk aversion tends to change over time (see Bekaert, Engstrom, and Grenadier (2010) and the references therein) and people's ranking over consumption outcomes may vary as well. Consider the dynamic behavior of a forward looking decision maker, who is aware that his tastes may change, and who embraces the future changes in tastes, in the sense that he evaluates future consumption based on his expectation over future consumption tastes. On the one hand, if tastes evolve randomly, then he prefers not to commit to consumption choice in advance. On the other hand, if tastes are correlated between subsequent periods, then the reluctance to commit will be reduced as the time of consumption draws nearer. That is, the decision maker prefers to delay commitment.1
Speci cally, we consider a decision maker who perceives a particular type of Markov process that governs the evolution of his tastes, that is, his current taste is a suf cient statistic for his current believe over future tastes. We then analyze preferences over In nite Horizon Consumption Problems as introduced in Gul and Pesendorfer (2004) (henceforth GP) where, in every period, choice is between lotteries over current consumption and a continuation choice problem for the next period.
As argued above, our decision maker will want to delay commitment in general, but due to the Markovian structure of the process that governs the evolution of tastes, he is willing to commit to a continuation problem for the next period, contingent on the current taste. While this taste is not observable by the analyst, we argue that strategic rationality should also hold contingent on current consumption choice from a large enough menu. We formalize this notion in an axiom called Choice Contingent Continuation Strategic Rationality (Choice Contingent CSR) . The Markov process that governs the evolution of tastes over time in our representation is uniquely identi ed from rst period preferences, as is the only other preference parameter, the discount factor.
If tastes are correlated over time, knowledge of the taste at one point will reduce an individual's uncertainty about future consumption tastes. In that case, the individual's willingness to commit to a consumption choice should increase between one period and the next, more so the more correlated tastes are over time. For example, an investor will be more willing to commit to a more or less risky portfolio (say by accepting a penalty for reallocating his funds) given his (1) Following Kreps (1979) and Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) , models of preference for exibility have been used to capture a decision maker with the desire to accommodate future changes in taste in an environment with only one instance of consumption choice, leaving no room for changes in the willingness to commit over time. current risk aversion, if his risk aversion is strongly correlated over time. This is independent of ex-ante uncertainty about the level of risk aversion. Theorem 2 provides comparative statics that formalize this intuition. Krishna and Sadowski (2014) (henceforth KS) model a decision maker in a dynamic environment who chooses over acts on an objective space of states of the world, and who has stable but noisy state-contingent tastes. A common special case of their model and ours features a stable and state independent underlying taste that is perturbed by iid noise (or transient taste shocks). Our main axiom relaxes their notion of unconditional Continuation Strategic Rationality, and some of our more standard axioms are comon to both models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 speci es our environment, the axioms and the representation result. Section 3 has the comparative statics and Section 4 concludes by discussing related decision theoretic literature and directions for future research.
. A Model of Randomly Evolving Tastes
This section provides our representation result. Section 2.1 describes the environment, Section 2.2 has the behavioral axioms, Section 2.3 contains the representation result and Section 2.4 provides intuition for the proof of the representation result.
Environment
For a compact metric space Y , let P.Y / denote the space of probability measures endowed with the topology of weak convergence, so that P.Y / is compact and metrizable. Let F.Y / denote the space of closed subsets of a compact metric space Y , endowed with the Hausdorff metric, which makes F.Y / a compact metric space.
Let K be a nite set of consumption prizes with typical member k. We follow GP in de ning an in nite horizon consumption problem (IHCP) as a collection of lotteries that yield a prize in the present period and a new in nite horizon problem starting in the next period. Let Z be the collection of all IHCPs.2 GP show that Z is a compact metric space, and that each´2 Z can be identi ed with a compact set (2) See GP for the recursive construction of Z. of probability measures over K Z. In particular, it can be shown that Z is linearly homeomorphic to the space of all closed subsets of P.K Z/. We shall denote this linear homeomorphism by Z ' F P.K Z/ . Typical elements x; y;´2 Z are interpreted as menus of lotteries over consumption and continuation problems, while p; q 2 P.K Z/ are typical lotteries, with p k and p´denoting the marginal distributions of p on K and Z.
We explicitly model choice between consumption problems from an ex-ante perspective, before consumption begins. That is, we analyze a binary relation Z Z, which we refer to as a preference. We let and denote, respectively, the asymmetric and symmetric parts of . The recursive domain of IHCPs is rich; for instance, it can accommodate temporal lotteries as in Kreps and Porteus (1978) . It is also amenable to analysis by stochastic dynamic programming.
We will also consider the space of menus of consumption lotteries, F P.K/ , with typical members being a; b; c. By the recursive nature of Z, continuation problems are members of Z. Let A; B; C denote typical elements of the collection of menus of continuation lotteries, F P.Z/ . To ease notational burden, we will often write F for F P.K Z/ , F K for F P.K/ , and F Z for F P.Z/ . When there is no risk of confusion, we identify prizes and continuation problems with degenerate lotteries and lotteries with singleton menus. For example, we denote the lottery over continuation problems that yields´with certainty by´, and the lottery that yields current consumption k and continuation problem x with certainty by .k; x/.
Axioms
Axioms 1-5 are fairly standard and are discussed in more detail in KS.
A 1 (Non-triviality). is non-trivial, in the sense that there exist x; y 2 Z such that x y.
A 2 (Continuous Order). satis es the following: (a) is complete and transitive. (b) is continuous, in the sense that fy W y xg and fy W x yg are closed.
We take the convex sum of sets to be the Minkowski sum, namely x C .1 /y WD f p C .1 /q W p 2 x; q 2 yg whenever 2 OE0; 1. Notice that if x; y 2 F, then x C .1 /y is also closed, and hence is in F. The following axiom is von Neumann-Morgenstern's Independence axiom.
A standard decision maker is one whose preferences are strategically rational in the sense that x y implies x [ y x. A standard decision maker who satis es Axiom 2 chooses as if he evaluates each set by its best element. There exists, then, a continuous function w W P.K Z/ ! R that is linear, such that the functional x 7 ! max p2x w.p/ represents .4
We are interested in a decision maker (henceforth DM) who values exibility.
This is the central axiom in Kreps (1979) . It says that additional alternatives are always weakly bene cial.
Theorem 4 in KS shows that Axioms 1-4 are necessary and suf cient to afford a nitely additive EU representation. In particular, there exists a subjective state space, U K Z , which is a collection of all the (twice-normalized) vN-M utility functions on K Z, along with the Borel algebra A U K Z , and a charge on U K Z that induces the preference functional
The state space U K Z consists of all continuous functions on K Z that are identi ed up to positive af ne transformation. In particular, all the utility functions in U K Z have (i) the same utility for some x 2 Z, and (ii) the same (supremum) norm. The rst requirement corresponds to normalizing the constant term to 0, and the second requirement amounts to normalizing the scaling factor to 1.5 (3) A lottery p 2 P.K Z/ is a singleton menu. A weaker version of Independence is Singleton Independence, which says that Independence holds for all singleton menus. GP show that Singleton Independence along with Stationarity (Axiom 6) and Indifference to Timing (Axiom 7) imply Independence (Axiom 3) assumed here. (4) See footnote 5 of GP for a formal argument. (5) There exists a unique element x 2 Z such that x ' .p k ; x / 2 F, where x consists of the uniform lottery over K, namely p k 2 P.K/, in each period. Analogous to the de nition in DLR, we formally have Versions of the next two axioms appear in GP, who provide a more detailed discussion. We are interested in stationary preferences, where the ranking of continuation problems does not depend on time. The recursive nature of the domain allows us to capture this notion via the following axiom, which says that if x y, then x is also better than y as a continuation problem after consumption of k. Recall that .k; x/ denotes the degenerate lottery that gives .k; x/ 2 K Z with probability one. In what follows, we will nd particular use for menus with a product structure.
De nition 2.1. For p 2 P.K Z/, let p k 2 P.K/ and p´2 P.Z/ be the corresponding marginals, and let .p k ; p´/ be the product lottery. For c 2 F K and A 2 F Z , we write .c; A/ 2 Z to denote the rectangular menu f.p k ; p´/ W p k 2 c; p´2 Ag.
If x Z is closed, then .k; x/ WD f.k; x/ W x 2 xg. For closed x; y Z, let x C .1 /y be the menu of continuation problems f x C .1 /y W x 2 x; y 2 yg. Notice that although x 2 F Z , it consists only of degenerate lotteries.
While our domain is suf ciently rich to permit different attitudes towards temporal lotteries and the timing of the resolution of uncertainty, we shall keep matters as close as possible to the standard model. That is, we shall abstract from particular patterns of preference for the timing of uncertainty, and consider the axiom.
A
7 (Indifference to Timing). .k; x/ C .1 /.k; y/ .k; x C .1 /y/ for all 2 OE0; 1, k 2 K and x; y Z.
The axiom states that DM is indifferent between (i) receiving lottery .k; x/C .1 /.k; y/, which yields consumption k and determines whether the continuation problem will be chosen from x or y, (early resolution) and (ii) receiving with certainty consumption k and choosing a continuation menu from x C .1 /y (late resolution). The version of Indifference to Timing state above is stronger than that considered in GP or KS. This is because our present setting allows DM to have a preference for exibility with respect to continuation problems, while GP and KS do not.
Separability (Axiom 5) allows us to consider an induced marginal preference relation K F K F K . Lemma B.1 in Appendix B.1 shows that for a separable preference that has a nitely additive EU representation, K is independent of the choice of A 2 F Z . In order to elicit continuation preferences contingent on any particular consumption ranking, we aim to identify two consumption menus a and b in F K with a [ b K b, such that the best alternative is in a only under that consumption ranking. This is only possible if the collection of relevant consumption rankings is nite. Intuitively, if every set a has a nite subset b that is as good as a itself, then only a nite collection of consumption rankings can be relevant. The formal statement of this result is provided by Riella (2013, Theorem 2) , who establishes that Axiom 8 is the appropriate version of the niteness assumption in Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2009) (their Axiom 11) when Monotonicity (Axiom 4) is assumed (but see also Lemma B.2 in Appendix B.1 for a direct proof).
De nition 2.2. Fix
The next axiom is our main behavioral assumption. The goal is to require, in terms of behavior, that DM be strategically rational with respect to continuation problems contingent on his consumption ranking, K . Given a particular element of a nite collection of consumption rankings, it is straight forward to construct two consumption menus a and b in F K , such that the most preferred alternative from a [ b is in a only under that consumption ranking. Hence, it would be suf cient to ask DM, for all a; b with a [ b K b; whether he is strategically rational contingent on his preferred alternative from a [ b being in a.
However, this requirement would be too strong, as for some a and b, the best alternative is in a for more than one consumption ranking.6 In order to avoid such situations, we allow the addition of any collection of alternatives, c, to b, so long as
If the best alternative from a [ b is in a for only one ranking, this must remain true for any such c: If the best alternative is in a for multiple rankings, then there is c such that the best alternative from a [ b [ c is in a for only one ranking. Summing up, we would like to require the following: 
In the setting where DM considers only nitely many consumption rankings relevant, the axiom is falsi able in spite of the existential quali er. To see this, note that K determines the nite set of relevant consumption rankings. As noted in the discussion preceding the axiom, the construction of a and b such that a outperforms b for only one given consumption ranking is straightforward. For such a and b we may assume, without loss of generality, that the c whose existence (6) In particular, Continuation Strategic Rationality would be implied for a and b such that the best alternative is always in a. is guaranteed by the axiom is empty. This observation is formally established in Lemma B.3.
Finally, we want to ensure that ex-ante preferences are a useful description of choice on the recursive domain of IHCPs, in the sense that no alternative that is relevant from the ex-ante perspective can become permanently irrelevant in the future. To avoid conditioning on entire consumption paths, we impose the stronger requirement that the collection of relevant alternatives is not choice contingent.
A 10 (Persistent Preference for Flexibility). For all a; b 2 F K such that
The rst quali er considers two consumption menus a and b, where a is not dominated by b. Again, the axiom only has implications for the case where the preferred consumption choice is in a rather than b. The axiom says that, if x [ y x, then this must also be true contingent on the preferred consumption choice being in a. We emphasize that this requirement and Choice Contingent CSR (Axiom 9) are not mutually exclusive: contingent on next period's preferred consumption choice being in a, the singleton fx [ yg provides DM with additional alternatives for choice two periods from now, which he may value (Axiom 10), even though he is strategically rational with respect to the union fxg [ fyg (Axiom 9), which would force him to choose one of the two smaller continuation problems in the next period.
Preference for Flexibility with Ranking Persistent Utilities
Choice Contingent CSR allows for correlation of consumption utilities. To see this, notice that the choice of a lottery in a over any lottery in b [ c only carries information about DM's current ranking of immediate consumption and, contingent on this information, preferences are required to satisfy strategic rationality with respect to continuation problems. Hence, today's consumption ranking must be a suf cient statistic for today's beliefs over future consumption utilities. In what follows,
« denotes the space of all consumption utilities normalized up to an additive constant. Also, we shall say that a probability
Intuitively, a probability measure (or subjective belief) is nice if the expected utility from every prize k 2 K is nite.
De nition 2.4.
A ranking persistent Markov process . U M ; M / consists of a state space U M U that is a nitely generated cone,8 and a Markov kernel9 M from U M to itself, such that M is: (a) ranking contingent: M.u; / D M. u; / for all > 0, and
/ is a nice probability measure for each u 2 U M .
We identify the Markov process . U M ; M / by its Markov kernel M , when the state space U M is understood. The following lemma establishes that the class of ranking persistent Markov kernels is a desirable subclass of all Markov kernels on U, as ranking persistence guarantees the existence of a unique invariant (and hence ergodic) measure of the Markov process.10 Lemma 2.5. If . U M ; M / is a ranking persistent Markov process, then an invariant measure 0 of M exists and is unique, where
A proof is in appendix A. As before, we represent integrals with respect to measures as extensions by linearity and continuity, which allows us to write
Similarly, V .p´; u/ denotes the linear extension (by continuity) of V .´; u/ from Z to P.Z/.
De nition 2.6. Let ı 2 .0; 1/ and let . U M ; M / be a nice, ranking persistent Markov process. A preference has an evolving tastes representation . U M ; M /; ı , if
It is nitely generated if it is generated by a nite set. (9) Let .X; X/ be a measurable space. Then, M W X X ! OE0; 1 is a Markov kernel from .X; X/ to itself if (i) for each x 2 X, M.x; / is a probability measure on .X; X/; and (ii) for each D 2 X, M. ; D/ is a measurable function de ned on X. The Markov kernel represents the transition probabilities for a Markov process with state space X. (10) This is intuitive, because the induced Markov process on the relevant rankings is fully connected. For the purpose of the identi cation results it would be suf cient to consider irreducible Markov processes on the relevant rankings. Note that this generalization is small, in the sense that the class of fully connected Markov processes is dense in the class of irreducible processes. The small gain in generality does not seem to warrant imposing a weaker, but harder to falsify assumption that only requires the existence of some nite consumption path, contingent on which persistence is satis ed.
V . ; 0 / represents , where 0 is the invariant measure of M , and V is de ned recursively as
Because 0 is the invariant measure of the Markov process, V .x; 0 / takes the intuitive form
To see this, consider some menu x 2 Z. Then,
where the rst equality uses equation [2.1] , the second equality uses Fubini's theorem to reverse the order of integration, and 0 .du
0 is the invariant distribution of the Markov process. The ranking persistence of M implies that for all u 2 U, V .x; u/ D V .x; u/ for all > 0.
Proposition 2.7. Each evolving tastes representation . U M ; M /; ı induces a unique continuous function V 2 C.Z U M / that satis es equation [2.1] above.
The proof is in Appendix B.4. We shall say that two Markov processes The proof of the theorem is in Appendix B. The next section provides a sketch of the most instructive steps in the proof of the theorem, and also demonstrates how the recursive structure of the evolving tastes representation implies uniqueness of M up to scaling, even though the continuation value varies with the consumption utility.
Proof Intuition for the Evolving Tastes Representation
Theorem 3 of KS establishes the existence of a nitely additive EU representation. KS (appendix C) show that by Separability, each utility u 2 U K Z can be written
2) also show that if a preference with a nitely additive EU representation is strategically rational -ie, x y implies x x [ y -it can be viewed as having only one relevant utility u 2 U K Z . In particular, the charge representing his subjective beliefs is a probability measure concentrated at a single point.
Finiteness implies that there are only nitely many relevant consumption rankings. Let these relevant consumption rankings be u 1 ; : : : ; u n 2 U, and de ne
i OEu i , which will serve as the state space for the Markov process that we will construct as part of the representation. We argued, when discussing Choice Contingent CSR (Axiom 9), that we can establish strategic rationality with respect to continuation problems for any one of those consumption rankings. Therefore the consumption ranking must be a suf cient statistic for beliefs. That is, for each ranking OEu i there exists a unique v ; OEu i W F ! R that evaluates continuation problems, so that there are only nitely many valuations for continuation problems. This observation is key to showing that the representation is jointly identi ed because this allows us to show that the subjective state space can be taken to be nite dimensional, which in turn allows us to use DLR's joint identi cation result.
Persistent Preference for Flexibility (Axiom 10) implies that the functions v ; OEu i are monotone with respect to set inclusion and, in particular, are locally non-satiated. To show that the functions v ; OEu i are linear, let v i .´/ WD v.´; OEu i /, and consider the set O WD 
There exist sets x WD fx 1 ; : : : ; x n g and y WD fy 1 ; : : : ; y n g where
for all i ¤ j and similarly for y, and (iii)
x; y O. It is easy to see that for each 2 OE0; 1, .k; x i /C.1 /.k; y i / is the unique lottery in the menu .k; x/ C .1 /.k; y/ that maximizes u C ıv i . Indifference to Timing (Axiom 7) allows us to conclude that, x i C .1 /y i 2 Z is the unique maximizer of v i from the set x C .1 /y Z for each i , and for i D 1 in particular, which is a contradiction. This establishes that v i is linear on O.
Thus, each v i has a nitely additive EU representation. By Stationarity (Axiom 6), we show that has a recursive representation
where the discount factor may only depend on the consumption ranking, that is, ı.u/ D ı. u/ for all > 0, and . U M ; M / is a ranking contingent Markov process such that
We need to establish that the value function V can be renormalized to make the discount factor independent of u. Suppose, for simplicity, that the support of 0 is U D fu 1 ; :::; u n g where no u i and u j are collinear. Suppose also that there exists a value function
that represents and features a constant discount factor. The uniqueness result in DLR implies that O U and U must correspond to the same collection of vN-M rankings. That is, there is a reordering of O U such that .u i / WD u i = O u i is well de ned for i D 1; : : : ; m.
With i . / WD M.u i ; /, we write h i ; i to denote
: : : ; m and clearly h i ; i must hold. The Markov process M is ranking persistent, and hence the support of i is U for all i 2 f0; : : : ; mg. Suppose .u i / ¤ .u j / for some i; j 2 f0; : : : ; mg. Pick the i that minimizes .u i / and observe that .u i / <
for all i; j 2 f0; : : : ; mg, which just says that f i W i D 0; : : : ; mg and f O i W i D 0; : : : ; mg must be identical up to a common scaling.
To better understand why Persistent Preference for Flexibility (Axiom 10) is necessary, we now provide an example of a preference that satis es all axioms except Axiom 10, and show that it does not have an evolving tastes representation. Suppose can be represented by the value function V above where
The interpretation is that (11) It is easy to see that with and A de ned as above, A is the square matrix where the row of A that corresponds to u is multiplied by ı.u/.
today DM is uncertain about tomorrow's consumption utility, but once he learns his utility, he does not expect it to ever change again. In that case, there is no representation with a constant discount factor, because
. Correlated Tastes and Delayed Commitment
Tastes in our model are correlated over time. Thus, DM's knowledge of his taste at one point in time might reduce his uncertainty about future tastes. This implies that DM's willingness to commit to future consumption upon learning his current taste will depend on the degree to which his tastes are correlated over time. We now formalize this intuition as a basis for comparing decision makers.12
Given our model, we calculate the discounted expected future taste contingent on the initial taste realization, averaged over time and over the realizations of the Markov transitions. The distribution over initial tastes thus generates a distribution over discounted expected future tastes. The more informative initial taste realizations are about discounted expected future tastes, the more disperse this distribution will be. This is how we propose to measure the correlation of tastes over time.
Let Z S be the collection of time separable choice problems, in which choice does not affect the distribution over continuation problems, and hence consumption choice does not involve any commitment. Thus, Z S D F , respectively. In order to compare DM and DM , we assume that both agree on the ranking of time-separable problems which, by construction, do not offer any opportunity to commit after learning the initial taste.
De nition 3.1. DM and DM
agree on separable problems if for all´;´0 2 Z S ,´ ´0 if and only if´ ´0 .
(12) It is also going to be true that a decision maker with more uncertain tastes will have stronger preference for exibility, which is in complete analogy to Theorem 2 in KS. In their model, taste shocks are transient, which precludes the type of comparison considered here. , and (ii) there is > 0 such that for all u 2 U,
A proof is in Appendix C. The proposition establishes that both representations discount the future at the same rate, and (up to a positive scalar) they also agree on the ex ante weight they assign to each vN-M ranking, where the weight is the aggregate of the probability assigned to all utilities that correspond to that ranking, weighted by their scaling.
This allows us to normalize the representations so that D 1 in Proposition 3.2. Given this normalization, we now introduce our measure of the correlation of tastes over time.
For the evolving tastes representation . U M ; M /; ı with ergodic distribution
This lets us de ne the function
Let Q be the probability measure on U that is de ned as
for all measurable E U. In words, Q U .u/ is the discounted expected future taste (in present value terms) contingent on taste u. The measure Q is the measure over these discounted expected tastes induced by the ergodic distribution over initial tastes.
Let Z iid be menus of iid lotteries over K, where an iid lottery is a sequence of lotteries of the form p k WD .p k ; p k ; : : : / where p k 2 P.K/. Then, Z iid D F fp k W (13) Let Q be a Markov kernel from U to itself. Then, Q is a dilation if it preserves expectations, ie, A proof is in Appendix C. We argued at the outset of this section that it is plausible that a decision maker whose tastes are more correlated over time is more open to commit to a consumption choice after initially learning his taste. The theorem spells out the correct notion of correlation of tastes.
. Related Literature
Rather than passively learning about the taste, as in our model, a decision maker might actively contemplate his taste, where such contemplation is costly. Ergin and Sarver (2010) provide a model of costly contemplation in the context with only one instance of consumption choice, as rst analyzed by Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) . A related model in a dynamic context is provided by Dillenberger, Krishna, and Sadowski (2016) , where the decision maker tries to learn about the veri able state of the world, rather than his own taste. Piermont, Takeoka, and Teper (2015) consider a forward looking decision maker with a stable but unknown taste, who expects to learn through exploration. That is, rather than experiencing changing tastes, the decision maker becomes more and more informed about his stable taste as he experiences different consumption alternatives.
Tastes could also change in response to consumption, as in the context of habit forming preferences, where the forward looking DM understands how his consumption choice today will affect preferences in the future. A dynamic model of habit formation along the lines of the model presented in this paper is the subject of a separate research project.
A forward looking DM who expects his tastes to change over time is affected by his attitude towards those changes. In this paper we consider one extreme, where DM embraces changes and tries to accommodate them. In the other extreme he may resent changing tastes; he acknowledges that his choice in the future will be governed by the changed tastes, but in the current period he evaluates this future choice based on the current taste. As a consequence, he wants to commit to a future choice now. This is the familiar intuition behind models of time inconsistent preferences with sophistication, as for example in O' Donaghue and Rabin (2000) . Based on the model by Strotz (1955) , in which preferences change over time in a deterministic fashion, Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) analyze how such a decision maker chooses between different dynamic decision problems that are similar to ours.
Of course, it is plausible that a decision maker would nd it desirable to retain the exibility to react to some aspects of his changing tastes (as in our model), while at the same time seeking to commit not to accommodate other changes (as in GP). For example, he might want to accommodate changes in risk aversion while committing not to accommodate changes in his discount factor. We leave an investigation of the interaction of the two attitudes towards changing tastes as another topic for future research.
Appendices

A. Proofs of Lemma .
By de nition of the Markov process . U M ; M /, there exist u 1 ; u 2 ; : : : ; u n 2 U such that U M WD cone fu 1 ; : : : ; u n g . Denoting OEu i D f u i W > 0g, we see an induced Markov chain on the rankings, with state space fOEu i W i D 1; : : : ; ng, and with transition probabilities M OEu i ; OEu j , where we have abused notation, because M.u i ; / D M. u i ; / for all > 0. This is a Markov chain on a nite state space, and because all transition probabilities are strictly positive, there is a unique invariant distribution 0 OEu i .
Let be any measure on U M such that OEu i D 0 OEu i for i D 1; : : : ; n.
De ne the measure 0 on U M as follows: for any measurable 
B. Proof of Theorem
Some steps of our proof parallel the proof of the representation theorem in KS. We refer to formal statements in KS by adding the letters KS to their numbering. Thus, Lemma nKS refers to Lemma n in KS, and similarly for Propositions and Theorems.
B.1. Separable Representation: Existence and Identi cation
The relevant domain here is Z ' F P.K Z/ . Lemma 20KS establishes that if has a nitely additive EU representation (Theorem 3KS) and satis es Separability (Axiom 5), then it has a separable representation of the form To see that must have nite support, suppose not. Let a be the ball of radius " around p k , the uniform lottery over K. It is easy to see that because has in nite support, there can be no nite b a such that ' K .b/ D ' K .a/, which contradicts Finiteness (Axiom 8).
Lemma B.3. Suppose has a separable representation as in [B.1] , and also satis es Finiteness (Axiom 8). Fix r 2 U K such that .r / > 0. Let a; b 2 F K be such that max˛2 a r .˛/ > max˛2 b r .˛/ and max˛2 a r.˛/ < max˛2 b r.˛/ for all r ¤ r . For such a; b 2 F K , we may take c D b in Choice Contingent CSR (Axiom 9). Proof. As before, we may regard as a charge on U K OE0; 1 U Z . We will show that for each r 2 U K , the induced marginal charge . jr / has singleton support in OE0; 1 U Z . Proposition 20KS implies that the separable representation can be written as
Proof. By hypothesis, has a representation of the form
Fix r in the nite support of the marginal of on .
The function is a utility function on F Z . It is easily seen that is linear, and monotone, and induces a preference on F Z that is continuous, satis es Independence (Axiom 3), and Monotonicity (Axiom 4). Displays [B.2] and [B.3] now imply that the preference induced by is strategically rational, and so for each r , the marginal of on U Z has singleton support (see Proposition 15KS), which completes the proof. The proposition further implies that W is Z-simple in the sense that the marginal of on U Z has nite support. It follows from Proposition 23KS that the representation is jointly identi ed and is a regular probability measure on U K OE0; 1 U Z . We can rewrite the representation, transforming U K OE0; 1 U Z to become U U Z . Proposition B.4 implies that each consumption state u 2 U corresponds to a unique continuation utility function v. ; u/. Hence, we may assume that the state space is U and let 0 be the corresponding measure on U.
Proposition B.4 implies that there exists a continuous
Let U WD supp. 0 / be the support of 0 . By Proposition B.4, there exists fu 1 ; : : : ; u n g U such that U U M D S >0 fu 1 ; : : : ; u n g. As before, we write OEu WD f u W > 0g for all u 2 U M . Intuitively, OEu is an equivalence class of consumption utilities, all of which induce the same continuation utility. Thus, we may write W .x/ as
Proposition B.5. In the representation in [B.4] , the marginal of 0 on each OEu i is identi ed uniquely up to scaling.
Proof. De ne
Arguments analogous to those in Proposition 25KS establish that the marginal of 0 on each OEu i is identi ed up to scaling, which proves the proposition.
B.2. Recursive, Uniformly Ranking Persistent Representation
To show that a recursive representation exists, we need to rst show that the functions v. ; OEu i / W Z ! R in [B.4] 
Because O is open, given x; y 2 O, we can construct an amenable pair .x; y/ such that x D x i 2 x and y D y i 2 y. In particular, this demonstrates that amenable sets exist.
For each 2 OE0; 1, de ne z WD xC.1 /y. As x and y consist of degenerate lotteries, z also consists of degenerate lotteries. For each i D 1; : : : ; n, de ne « i W OE0; 1 x y as follows:
We shall establish some properties of « i for amenable pairs .x; y/. Proposition B.9. Let have a representation as in [B.4] , and suppose satis es Indifference to Timing (Axiom 7). Then, the correspondence « has the following properties: (a) « i is 'onto'. That is, for each 2 OE0; 1 and x 2 x, there exists j such that x i 2 « j;x . /, with a similar claim for y i 2 y.
Proof. In the proof, we make repeated use of the fact that by Indifference to Timing (Axiom 7), W ..k; x// C .1 /W ..k; y// D W ..k; z // for all 2 OE0; 1. (a) Suppose not, so that x i … « j;x for any j D 1; : : : ; n. Then, by perturbing x i , we obtain a contradiction to the equality W ..k; x// C .1 /W ..k; y// D W ..k; z // and the fact that .x; y/ is an amenable pair.
(b) Suppose not, so for some 2 .0; 1/, « i . / D f.x j ; y j / W j D 1; : : : ; mg. Let WD inff W « i . / is not a singletong. It is easy to see that > 0. It is also easy to see that we may choose, without loss of generality, x and y such that there exists a unique i where « i . / is not a singleton. Since « is onto (as established above), we can perturb one of the elements of « i . / without affecting W ..k; z //, but affecting W ..k; x// C .1 /W ..k; y//, which is a contradiction. Proof. Recall that Z is compact and v i is continuous on Z, which implies that v i is, in fact, uniformly continuous on Z. Lemma B.7 says that because satis es Persistent Preference for Flexibility (Axiom 10), O is dense in Z. Therefore, it suf ces to show that v i is linear on O, because by lemma 3.8 of Aliprantis and Border (1999) , v i has a unique continuous extension to Z (which must also be linear). Suppose now that there exist x; y 2 O such that 
for an amenable pair .x; y/ with x D x i 2 x and y D y i 2 y. By the properties of the function « , we see that
where Ä and Ã do not depend on x and y (locally). It is easy to see that we can now perturb x (say) such that [ ] no longer holds, which proves our claim.
Proposition B.11. Let have a representation as in [B.4] where v. ; OEu/ is linear, and suppose satis es Stationarity (Axiom 6) and Persistence (Axiom 10). Then, there is a value function
for all u 2 U M , where . U M ; M / is a ranking contingent Markov process where supp. 0 / U M , such that
is a representation of .
Proof. For rectangular menus of the form f.k; x/g, [B.4] becomes
where v. ; OEu/ is continuous and linear. The last equality follows because
Notice that the second term does not depend on x. By Theorem 3, each v. ; OEu/ induces a preference OEu on F P.K Z/ that is continuous and satis es Independence (Axiom 3). We claim: Claim B.12. For each u 2 U M , OEu also satis es Monotonicity (Axiom 4).
Proof of Claim. Let
Suppose, contrary to the claim, that x OEu i x [ y for i D 1; : : : ;`but x [ y OEu i x for i D`C 1; : : : ; n for some`2 f1; : : : ; ng. By appropriately perturbing y if necessary, we may take y such that x [ y x (because is continuous Theorem 3 then implies that because v. ; OEu/ represents OEu , and because v. ; OEu/ is continuous, linear, and monotone with respect to set inclusion, v. ; OEu/ can be written as
where OEu is a probability charge on U K Z , and ı.OEu/ is the scaling factor that allows us to take OEu to be a probability charge. 
Then, the last line in the display above can be written as
where on U K Z is not necessarily a probability charge. Following the arguments in Proposition 28KS, and using the fact that OEu is a suf cient statistic for v 2 U Z , we may take 0 to be de ned on U K Z . By virtue of Proposition 23KS, which says that the state space and measure are jointly identi ed, it must be that 0 / .
This implies the carrier of coincides with the carrier of 0 and is nite. But is the positive linear combination of charges OEu on U K Z , and therefore, the carrier of each OEu (where u 2 U M ) must be a subset of the carrier of , and hence of the carrier of 0 , which is a subset of U M . This allows us to write
It is clear that M is ranking contingent. Also de ne ı.u/ WD ı.OEu/, and V .x; u/ WD v.x; OEu/=ı.u/ to nd the recursive value function [B.5] . Finally, plugging into equation [B.4] , and de ning V .x; 0 / WD W .x/, we see that V .x; 0 / as in [B.6] represents , as desired.
We now show that the Markov kernel M is uniformly ranking persistent. Proposition B.13. Let have a recursive representation as in [B.6] , and suppose satis es Persistent Preference for Flexibility (Axiom 10). Then, M u; OEu
Proof. Suppose M.u 0 ; OEu/ D 0 for some u; u 0 2 U M . Construct menus x; y such that
Similarly, construct consumption menus a and b, such that max˛2 
B.3. Representation with Constant Discount Factor: Existence and Uniqueness
Propositions B.11 and B.13 establish that has a recursive representation as in [B.5] and [B.6] , with a ranking persistent Markov process. Our goal is to show that there exists a unique equivalent representation with a constant discount factor. We now describe, in brief, how the approach parallels the construction of a representation with a constant discount factor that leads to the DPF representation in KS.
In the DPF representation, the states are S D f1; : : : ; ng and uncertain utilities are described by measures s that depend on the state s 2 S , while the Markov process on states S is given by the transition probabilities˘.s 0 ; s/. In the evolving tastes representation, the uncertain utilities are described by the ranking contingent Markov kernel M.u; /, wherein M.u; / D M. u; /. Moreover, the probability of the ranking In the DPF representation, at each instant in time, DM's uncertainty about utilities in the next period can be decomposed into uncertainty about the state s 2 S and the conditional probabilities over utilities in U given by s . Formally, this determines a probability measure over S U.
In the evolving tastes representation, uncertainty about utilities in U M can be decomposed into uncertainty about the ranking OEu i , given by M.u; OEu i /, and uncertainty about the intensity of the utility, conditional on the ranking, given by M.u; E/=M.u; OEu i / where E OEu i is measurable. Thus, the formal structure of the two representations is essentially the same.
In order to obtain a representation with a constant discount factor, one can apply the same transformations that we used in the case of the DPF representation as in Proposition 30KS. The Perron Theorem implies that such a representation exists and is unique. In particular, the distribution of intensities given the ranking OEu i is uniquely identi ed. To identify the stationary distribution 0 of M , it suf ces then to calculate the stationary distribution of the induced Markov process on rankings.
Once we have a representation with a constant discount factor, all that remains is to show that the discount factor is less than one. This is done in a manner parallel to Proposition 32KS for the DPF representation.
De ne the measure u . / WD M.u; /. Let 2 R n CC be strictly positive, divide both sides of equation [B.6] by h 0 ; i WD P n i D1 0 .OEu i / .OEu i /, and rewrite equation [B.6] as [B.5] can be rewritten as B.7] where O V .x; 0 / represents . Before proceeding, it is worthwhile to discuss why these transformations are the only transformation that we need consider. By a variation of Proposition 25KS, we see that any transformation of a measure O u must be a scaling on the set OEu for each OEu U M . Therefore, we must have
for all 0 > > 0, j D 1; : : : ; n. In particular, the variation of Proposition 25KS says that u .OEu i / and ı.u i /V . ; u i / must be identi ed up to the same scaling, so that we must also transform ı.u i /V . ;
But such a transformation means that ı.u/ and V . ; u/ must be transformed as above. We are now in a position to state and prove the following: Proposition B.14. In the transformation of [B.5] to [B.7] 
Since both W .x; 0 / and V .x; 0 / represent , our uniqueness statement says that they must induce the same measure over U. This implies that for each u 2 U, Proof. For the menu .k; x/ 2 Z, V .k; x/ D 0 u k C ıV .x; 0 /, where we have used the fact that 0 is the invariant measure of M . As V .x/ and V .k; x/ are both nite (by de nition of V ), it follows that 0 u k 2 R for all k, which proves that 0 is nice. A similar proof establishes that M.u; / is nice for all u.
We shall now establish that the discount factor ı is less than 1. Proposition B.17. If has a recursive representation of the form in (B.7) with constant ı, then ı 2 .0; 1/.
Proof. We have already shown that ı > 0, therefore it suf ces to show that ı < 1.
Let a be the " neighbourhood of p k for some suf ciently small " > 0. Then, for all u 2 U M and x 2 Z. It is easy to see that˚is monotone, ie, W Ä W 0 implies˚W Ä˚W 0 , and satis es discounting, ie,˚.W C / Ä˚W C ı when 0. Moreover,˚W .x; u/ D˚W .x; u/ for all > 0. If we assume that˚W 2 C.Z U M // for all W 2 C.Z U M /, it follows that˚is a contraction mapping (with modulus ı), and has a unique xed point which establishes the proposition.
For each x 2 Z, u 2 U M , and W 2 C.Z U M /, de ne .p k / kuk 2ˇ, M 2;u > 0, and the bounds follow from the de nition of u 2 U, the compactness of Z, the continuity of W , the fact that M is a nice ranking persistent Markov process, and because W . ; u/ D W . ; u/ for all > 0. As W . ; u/ is continuous, the function u.p k / C ıW .p´; u/ 2 C K Z is a continuous, linear functional on P.K Z/, when the latter is endowed with the topology of weak convergence (which is metrizable). Therefore, by the Maximum Theorem, for each u 2 U M , '.x; u/ is continuous in x.
We will now show that if .x n / 2 Z 1 is a sequence that converges to x 2 Z, then˚W .x n ; / !˚W .x; / whenever W 2 C.Z U M /. (Since U M is a nitely generated cone, and because W . ; u/ D W . ; u/ for all > 0, any sequence of u's in U M can be replaced by a sequence on the equivalence classes fOEu i W i D 1; : : : ; ng, which is nite. This sequence must eventually be constant, so we may assume, without loss of generality, that this constant is u 2 U M .)
Consider any sequence .x n / that converges to x. By the bounds established above, j'.x n ; u/j Ä kuk 2 M 1 C M 2;u , and kuk 2 M 1 C M 2;u is M.u 0 ; /-integrable because M.u 0 ; / is nice. Moreover, D˚W .x; u/ As x and .x n / are arbitrary, we conclude that˚W 2 C.Z U M / whenever W 2 C.Z U M /. The equalities above rely on the Dominated Convergence Theorem to interchange the order of limits and integration, and the continuity of '. ; u 0 / for each u 0 to establish the pointwise limit. This completes the proof.
B.5. Putting it all together
We are now in a position to complete the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. It is straightforward to show that the representation satis es all the axioms. With regards to Choice Contingent CSR (Axiom 9), we can adapt the ideas from Lemma B.3 to construct consumption menus a and b such that a outperforms b in only one taste.
Consider then, a preference that satis es Non-triviality (Axiom 1), Order (Axiom 2), Independence (Axiom 3) and Monotonicity (Axiom 4). By Theorem 3KS, has a nitely additive, EU representation. As also satis es Separability (Axiom 5), it follows from Lemma 19KS and Proposition 20KS that any such nitely additive EU representation also has a nitely additive separable representation by the functional V .x/ D R U K OE0;1 U Z max p2x r.p k / C .1 /v.p´/ d .r; ; v/. By rewriting r.p k / C .1 /v.p´/ as u.p k / C v.p´/, where u D 1 r, and by making an appropriate transformation to the charge (using the change of state space Lemma 16KS), we may regard the state space as U U Z . Finiteness (Axiom 8) says that U , the carrier of the marginal charge on U, has nitely many non-collinear components. Proposition B.4 says that if the preference also satis es Choice Contingent CSR (Axiom 9), then for each u 2 U , the induced marginal charge . ju/ on U Z has singleton support. In other words, for each u 2 U , there corresponds a unique continuation value function v 2 U Z , which is denoted by v. ; OEu/, which allows us to take as a measure instead of as a charge.
Proposition B.10 says that because satis es Indifference to Timing (Axiom 7), v. ; OEu/ is also linear. Persistent Preference for Flexibility (Axiom 10) implies that v. ; OEu/ is monotone. All that remains is to show that there exists a recursive representation with a constant discount factor, that the discount factor is less than 1, and that 0 is the unique stationary distribution of the Markov process. These are established in Propositions B.15-B.17.
C. Proofs from Section
Proof of Proposition 3.2. The 'if' part is straightforward. To see the 'only if' part, x a 2 F.P.K// and let´a 2 Z S be the separable menu that provides a in each period. Because and agree on separable problems, it follows that V and V are equivalent up to scaling on Z S . That is, 
where h ; i is a standard inner product and Q U and Q are de ned in [3.2] and [3.3] respectively.
But max p k 2´Q u.p k / is convex in Q u. Therefore, Theorem 7.2.1.7 in Torgersen (1991) (which generalizes the theorem of Blackwell (1953) to measures with unbounded support) implies that V .´; 0 / V .´; 0 / if, and only if, Q is a dilation of Q , as claimed.
